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Abstract
This paper discusses an experimental method for creating a 1st generation smart-phone honey-pot with the intention of
discovering automated worms. A Honeyd low-interaction virtual honey-pot is conceived as a possible method of
discovering automated smart-phone worms by emulating the operating system Windows Mobile 5 and Windows Mobile
6, along with the available TCP/UDP ports of each operating system. This is an experimental method as there are
currently no known malicious smart-phone worms. Honeyd emulates devices by mimicking the devices operating system
fingerprint which is created by the unique responses each operating system sends to a discrete series of TCP and UDP
packets sent by the network scanner Nmap. Honeyd uses the Nmap fingerprint database for how it should emulate these
responses each operating system. A significant obstacle was discovered during the implementation of the Honeyd smartphone honey-pot, as the format of fingerprints (2nd generation) utilised by Nmap are now different to the previous format
(1st generation) which is utilised by Honeyd. Honeyd cannot make use of the new Nmap format of the smart-phone
operating systems and thus a honeypot for smart-phones cannot be created. Future work forecasts the creation of a
technique to convert the new Nmap format to one which can be utilised by Honeyd.
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INTRODUCTION
A Smartphone is a device which unifies the functions of a cellular phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a digital
camera and a personal computer. Most Smartphones use proprietary operating systems (OS) such as Microsoft Windows
Mobile, Google Andriod or Symbian OS. An advantage of using such operating environments is third–party applications
can typically be installed onto these devices and multiple applications can be run simultaneously. A common feature of
Smartphones is the ability for developers and regular users to produce applications to run on these devices. Most smartphone operating system manufacturers also offer Software Development Kit’s (SDK) (Schmidt & Albayrak 2008). These
kits employ a selection of software that allows developers to create applications, based on factors including physical
device platform, operating system, programming language utilised and available / compatible hardware. But this feature
also provides a vector which can be used to infect smart-phones with malicious software.
Malicious software, otherwise known as malware, are programs created with a malicious intent and typically include
viruses, Trojan horses and automated worms. Most malware, especially for smart-phones, utilise some form of user
interaction for the malware to infect the device. As of 2006, there were more than 300 pieces of malware, including
worms, viruses and Trojan horses that had been created for Smart-phones. Most of these target the Symbian Operating
System. (Hypponen 2006) But as other Smartphone Operating Systems gain a larger market share, they will also become
greater targets.
Potentially the most damaging type of malware are automated worms. This form of malware requires no user-interaction
and infects devices through automated searching of victims and attacking vulnerabilities. The only known case of a
smart-phone worm was one created by Becher, Freiling & Leider (2007). The purpose of their study was to discover the
amount of time and effort it took to find vulnerability and create a worm for the Windows Mobile 5 Operating System.
They created a prototype worm which spread without user interaction which was achieved in 13 weeks, but were unable
to discover a current vulnerability to direct the worm to attack.
Furthermore, malware creators are expected to develop more sophisticated malware such as worms including. One such
attack vector discussed by Maurer (2003) was that of so-called super-worms that could intelligently attack hosts based
upon the operating system fingerprint such as created by Nmap to determine which exploits to attempt. While no
malware of this type have currently been detected with malicious intentions, this paper presents a 1st generation service
whose purpose will be to discover any automated malware for smart-phones, if it is created as predicted (Maurer 2003).
Honeypots and honeynets are automated tools which emulate a live network, but in reality are usually running on an
enclosed offline environment. Honeypots have a number of uses including identifying unusual or malicious activity on a
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network, identifying and capturing malicious software or malcode, used in network defence and network forensics.
Honeypots can simply emulate a network environment and return operating system variables, or they can be as complex
as emulating services or even re-directing to live servers.
The methodology used in this study is experimental in nature as there are no known automated smart-phone worms with
malicious intentions which can be reverse engineered to discover attack vectors. Hence the assumption is made that
automated worms search for victim devices based on the operating system and / or ports available (Becher, Freiling &
Leider 2007). Our method involved creating a Honeyd (Provos 2004) low-interaction honey-pot which emulates
Windows Mobile 5 and Windows Mobile 6 devices. To test the viability of this method, Nmap (Lyon 2008) network
scanner was to be utilised to determine if the honey-pot correctly emulates the devices to a scanning system, like an
automated worm may perform. Lastly our results are provided and future work is predicted.

METHODOLOGY
A method was conceived to create a system for the purpose of discovering the fourth category of Smart-phone malware,
namely automated worms, or malware which requires no user interaction.
As there is currently no known automated malware for Smart-phones with the majority of current malware being rogue
applications or imbedded in messages which use social engineering techniques to infect devices, it is difficult to
determine or create a methodology which could be utilised to capture such malware. Initially, this paper submits a
method which could be utilised to capture automated malware created for Smart-phones, based on the assumption that
most automated forms of malware such as worms scan for potential victims based on their Operating System or try to
infect all devices available.
This paper utilises the low-interaction honeypot concept. A honeypot is a networked system which does not serve any
purpose. Any traffic to that system we can deem as suspect or malicious as there is no reason for traffic to be sent to that
system (Hudak 2008). A low-interaction honeypot is merely an emulated device, which advertises certain ports but does
not provide any services, compared to a high-interaction honeypot which is typically an actual device (Spitzner 2002)
The theory behind the creation of this 1st Generation Smartphone honeypot is that automated malware typically searches
for victims based on the services or ports that are available. Detection of malware that attacks Smart-phone Operating
Systems will enhance the capabilities researches have available to discover, capture and understand the models and
attack vectors utilised by creators of this form of malware.

METHOD - A 1ST GENERATION SMARTPHONE HONEYPOT
This honeypot will only demonstrate network sniffer (Nmap) fingerprints of Smart-Phone operating systems and the
available ports as real smart-phone devices running the chosen operating systems would. No further services of the
smart-phone operating systems will be emulated. The function of this honeypot will be to discover if any malware has
been created targeting systems such as its emulated environments.
The major component for this honeypot is a Honeyd configured honeypot running on an Ubuntu Virtual Machine
emulating Windows Mobile (WM) 5 and WM6 Operating System environments.
Honeyd (Provos 2004) is a low-interaction virtual honeypot application that simulates computer systems at a network
level namely emulating the computer systems TCP/IP stack in combination with network infrastructure and network
routing emulation. Honeyd uses Nmap’s fingerprint database as its reference for an emulated device or operating systems
TCP and UCP behaviour. The purpose of Honeyd is to deceive malware and network scanners that it’s emulated devices
and operating systems are actually real devices.
NMap network scanner is used to test the viability of the Honeyd configuration. “Nmap (“Network Mapper”) is an open
source tool for network exploration and security auditing…(that) uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine what
hosts are available on the network, what services (application name and version) those hosts are offering (and) what
operating systems (and OS versions) they are running” (Lyon 2008). The Nmap application includes a file of Operating
System Fingerprints (nmap-os-db) which it uses to detect and display the host/s operating systems.
The advantage of using Honeyd as the honeypot software is it emulates different devices by responding to certain packets
in the appropriate way to create the unique fingerprint (based on an nmap fingerprint) for that device type. Additionally,
for each emulated device, we can list which ports should be available and in what state.
Even though Smart-phones typically use wireless networks or data-services provided by their mobile phone carrier, data
is transferred based on the TCP/IP protocol stack. Hence to reduce overheads, this honeypot will be initially deployed on
a wired network which will also have a wireless access point attached to the network. Further deployments of this
Honeypot virtual machine could be used on devices with wireless and carrier data-services connectivity.
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Creating the Honeypot
The first step was deciding which devices to emulate in the honeyd honeypot environment. Windows Mobile 5 (WM5)
and Windows Mobile 6 (WM6) operating systems were chosen for this initial honeypot, as they are commonly used
Smart-Phone operating environments, with 16.9% of the market in 2006 (Schmidt & Albayrak, 2008) and physical
devices running these environments were available for testing. Additionally WM5 and WM6 emulators are available
which could be utilised in Virtual Machines and integrated into Honeyd in future work and improvement of the smartphone honeypot.
Two HTC Hermes 100 smart-phones, one with Windows Mobile 5 installed and another with Windows Mobile 6
installed, were scanned using NMap to discover if they had any open ports available and if their Operating Systems were
detected.
Both smart-phones were configured to access a local wireless network and given a dynamic IP address. An advantage of
the Windows Mobile operating Systems is the ease of discovering the devices current network settings including IP
address.
A laptop, with NMap installed was also added to the wireless network. Several NMap scans were made of each device
using the following commands to discover open ports.
x

-sS TCP SYN scan

This scan sends SYN packets, as if you are going to open a real connection and then wait for a response. A
SYN/ACK reply indicates the port is listening (open), while a RST (reset) is indicative of a non-listener. If no
response is received after several retransmissions, the port is marked as filtered. (Lyon, 2008)
x

-sT TCP connect () scan

For this scan, Nmap asks the host device operating system to establish a connection with the target machine and
port by issuing the connect system call. This is the same high-level system call that web browsers, P2P clients,
and most other network-enabled applications use to establish a connection. (Lyon, 2008)
x

-sU UDP scan

For this scan, NMap sends an empty (no data) UDP header to every targeted port. If an ICMP port unreachable error
is returned, the port is closed. Occasionally, a service will respond with a UDP packet, proving that it is open. If
no response is received after retransmissions, the port is classified as open|filtered. This means that the port
could be open, or perhaps packet filters are blocking the communication. (Lyon, 2008)
x

-O Operating System FingerPrint Scan

This scan activates remote host identification via TCP/IP fingerprinting. Nmap sends a series of TCP and UDP
packets to the remote host and the results of these packets are combined to create unique fingerprint. The fingerprint
is then compared to the Nmap database of known Operating System fingerprints. (Valli 2003)
The output of the scans provided the following open ports:
Port:
137 UDP – Filtered | Open
NetBIOS - ns
Port:
138 UDP – Filtered | Open
NetBIOS - dgm
Port:
1034 UDP – Filtered | Open
Activesync - notify
OS:
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not
find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
OS details: HP Compaq t5520 thin client (Microsoft Windows CE 5.00),
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP1, Microsoft Windows Mobile 6 Classic or
Microsoft Zune audio player (firmware 2.2), Microsoft Windows CE 5.0
(ARM), Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP2, Microsoft Windows XP SP2
Figure 1. Windows Mobile 5 scan ouput.
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Port:
137 UDP – Filtered | Open
NetBIOS - ns
Port:
138 UDP – Filtered | Open
NetBIOS - dgm
OS:
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not
find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
OS details: HP Compaq t5520 thin client (Microsoft Windows CE 5.00),
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP1, Microsoft Windows Mobile 6 Classic or
Microsoft Zune audio player (firmware 2.2), Microsoft Windows CE 5.0
(ARM), Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP2, Microsoft Windows XP SP2
Figure 2. Windows Mobile 6 scan output.
The UDP port 137 was found to be Filtered | open on both devices. Becher, Freiling & Leider (2007) discussed how
every Windows Mobile device that connects to a Wireless network initially sends a series of NetBIOS datagrams on
UDP port 137 to the network broadcast address. Their proof-of –concept worm utilised a vulnerability in the Windows
Mobile network stack that allowed an infected device to capture NetBIOS messages and recover the IP addresses of
devices joining the network. The infected device would then send a copy of itself to the discovered IP address. This
method demonstrates that UDP port 137 could be one avenue that smartphone malware may utilise to discover and infect
victims, which is why it will be emulated by our honeypot.
The second step was discovering NMap finger prints for WM5 and WM6. A honeypots aim is to deceive a potential
attacker, be it automated malware or a human attacker. It attempts to achieve this deception through the use of Nmap
fingerprints to emulate devices and networks (2003). It is assumed that the same fingerprints used by Nmap will be also
used by Honeyd. Since no OS fingerprints for any Windows Mobile Operating Systems were discovered in the Honeyd
nmap.prints file, the OS fingerprints shown below were added to the nmap.prints file. These fingerprint personalities
were retrieved from the latest Nmap fingerprint ‘nmap-os-db’ file (Nmap OS Fingerprinting 2nd Generation DB 2009).
The same file is included in the latest Nmap application.
Fingerprint Microsoft Windows CE 5.0 (ARM)
Class Microsoft | Windows | PocketPC/CE | specialized
SEQ(SP=77-81%GCD=1-6%ISR=92-9C%TI=I%II=I%SS=O%TS=0)
OPS(O1=NNT11|M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%O2=NNT11|M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%3=NNT11|M5B4NW0NNT00%O4=NN
T11|M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%O5=%O=)
WIN(W1=832C%W2=8340%W3=8200%W4=81D0%W5=0%W6=0)
ECN(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B-85%TG=80%W=0%O=%CC=N%Q=)
T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=7B-85%TG=80%S=O%A=S+%F=A|AS%RD=0%Q=)
T2(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B-85%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T3(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B-85%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=O%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T4(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B-85%TG=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T5(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B85%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q)
T6(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B-85%TG=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T7(R=Y%DF=N%T=7B85%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q)
U1(DF=N%T=7B85%TG=80%IPL=B0%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%UCK=G%RUD=)
IE(DFI=S%T=7B-85%TG=80%CD=Z)

Fingerprint Microsoft Windows Mobile 6 or Zune audio player (firmware 2.2)
Class Microsoft | Windows | PocketPC/CE | general purpose
Class Microsoft | embedded || media device
SEQ(SP=75-9B%GCD=<7%ISR=92-9C%TI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS=0)
OPS(O1=M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%O2=M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%O3=M5B4NW0NNT00%O4=M5B4NW0NNT00NNS
%O5=M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%O6=M5B4NNT00NNS)
WIN(W1=832C%W2=8340%W3=8200%W4=81D0%W5=81D0%W6=805C)
ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%TG=80%W=832C%O=M5B4NW0NNS%CC=N%Q=)
T1(R=Y%DF=N|Y%T=80%TG=80%S=O|Z%A=S+%F=AR|AS%RD=0%Q=)
T2(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T3(R=Y%DF=N|Y%T=80%TG=80%W=0|805C%S=O|Z%A=O|S+%F=AR|AS%O=M5B4NW0NNT00NNS%RD=0%Q=
)
T4(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T5(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T6(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T7(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
U1(DF=N%T=80%TG=80%TOS=0%IPL=B0%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUL=G%RUD=G)
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IE(DFI=S%T=80%TG=80%TOSI=S%CD=Z%SI=S%DLI=S)

Fingerprint HTC TyTN II (Kaiser) mobile phone (Microsoft Windows Mobile 6)
Class Microsoft | Windows | PocketPC/CE | phone
SEQ(SP=82-8C%GCD=<7%ISR=92-9C%TI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS=0)
OPS(O1=M1F4ANW1NNT00NNS%O2=M1F4ANW1NNT00NNS%O3=M1F4ANW1NNT00%O4=M1F4ANW1NNT00
NNS%O5=M1F4ANW1NNT00NNS%O6=M1F4ANNT00NNS)
WIN(W1=FFFF%W2=FFFF%W3=FFFF%W4=FFFF%W5=FFFF%W6=FFFF)
ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%TG=80%W=FFFF%O=M1F4ANW1NNS%CC=N%Q=)
T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%TG=80%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)
T2(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%TG=80%W=FFFF%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%O=M1F4ANW1NNT00NNS%RD=0%Q=)
T4(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T5(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T6(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T7(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%TG=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
U1(DF=N%T=80%TG=80%TOS=0%IPL=B0%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUL=G%RUD=G)
IE(DFI=S%T=80%TG=80%TOSI=S%CD=Z%SI=S%DLI=S)

Figure 3. 2nd Generation Nmap Fingerprints

With knowledge of the operating system fingerprint personalities and having identified which ports and services are
available on WM5 and WM6 devices, the next step was installing Honeyd. In this instance, an Ubuntu Virtual Machine
was created and a modified version of Honeyd was installed. This modified version of Honeyd has been created by
Christian Kreibich to be used with his application Honeycomb.
Honeycomb (Kreibich & Crowcroft, 2003) is a pattern detection engine that monitors any network traffic that Honeyd
receives and creates NIDS signatures for any patterns that regularly occur. It is assumed that any regular traffic that
Honeyd receives is malicious in nature, as honey pots in general serve no other network purpose and should not be
receiving valid traffic. The advantages to using Honeycomb include reducing overhead caused by using additional
programs to perform the same task and it is integrated into Honeyd hence will not have any synchronisation issues.
Additionally the creation of NIDS signatures could be very useful for detecting very new automated mobile malware and
integrating the signatures into Network Intrusion Detection Systems on wireless networks to track the spread and effect
of such malware. Mobile Intrusion Detection Systems such as Gibraltar (Jacoby et al., 2006) could also utilise the
signatures.
An updated copy of the “nmap.prints” file, which contains the operating system fingerprints used by Honeyd to emulate
operating environments, was retrieved from another installation of Honeyd running the latest version. The reason for this
modification is the assumption that the latest version should include the most recent discovered nmap fingerprints for
new systems such as Windows Mobile5 and Windows Mobile 6.
The next step was creating the Honeyd configuration file to be used by the honeypot. The Honeyd configuration script
was:
ANNOTATE “Microsoft Windows CE 5.0 (ARM)”
ANNOTATE “Microsoft Windows Mobile 6 or Zune audio player (firmware2.2)”
ANNOTATE “HTC TyTN II (Kaiser) mobile phone (Microsoft Windows Mobile 6)”
CREATE Windows Mobile 5
SET Windows Mobile 5 PERSONALITY “Microsoft Windows CE 5.0 (ARM)”
BIND 192.100.0.10 Windows Mobile 5
SET DEFAULT Windows Mobile 5 TCP ACTION RESET
ADD Windows Mobile 5 UDP PORT 137 OPEN
ADD Windows Mobile 5 UDP PORT 138 OPEN
ADD Windows Mobile 5 UDP PORT 1034 OPEN
CREATE Windows Mobile 6
SET Windows Mobile 6 PERSONALITY “Microsoft Windows Mobile 6 or Zune audio player (firmware2.2)”
BIND 192.100.0.11 Windows Mobile 6
SET DEFAULT Windows Mobile 6 TCP ACTION RESET
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ADD Windows Mobile 6 UDP PORT 137 OPEN
ADD Windows Mobile 6 UDP PORT 138 OPEN

CREATE HTC
SET HTC PERSONALITY “HTC TyTN II (Kaiser) mobile phone (Microsoft Windows Mobile 6)”
BIND 192.100.0.12 HTC
SET DEFAULT HTC TCP ACTION RESET
ADD HTC UDP PORT 137 OPEN
ADD HTC UDP PORT 138 OPEN
Figure 4. Honeyd Configuration File
Lastly, after Honeyd was installed and configured, the honeypot was started with the following command
sudo honeyd –p /usr/local/share/honeyd/nmap.prints
eth0 192.100.0.10 192.100.0.11 192.100.0.12

–f

/usr/share/honeyd/honeyd.conf

–I

A laptop was also added to the same network as the Honeyd honeypot and Nmap was installed to test if the OS emulated
by the honeypot were correctly identified.

DISCUSSION
The major issue encountered during this research was that the operating system fingerprints (2nd generation) recovered
from the latest version of Nmap were not compatible with Honeyd. Additionally, the operating system fingerprints did
not have contemporaries (1st generation) within the nmap.prints file used by Honeyd to emulate operating system
fingerprints. While both fingerprint systems work by sending a specific number of packets to query the TCP/IP stack, and
create the unique fingerprint for the operating system based on how those packets are received and replied to, the format
of the output is different between Nmap and Honeyd.
Honeyd uses the fingerprint format (Figure 5) described by Fyodor (1998), which was also the 1st generation fingerprint
utilised initially by Nmap.
FingerPrint IRIX 6.2 - 6.4
TSeq(Class=i800)
T1(DF=N%W=C000|EF2A%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%Ops=MNWNNT)
T2(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=0%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=)
T3(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=C000|EF2A%ACK=O%Flags=A%Ops=NNT)
T4(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=R%Ops=)
T5(DF=N%W=0%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%Ops=)
T6(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=R%Ops=)
T7(DF=N%W=0%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=)
PU(DF=N%TOS=0%IPLEN=38%RIPTL=148%RID=E%RIPCK=E%UCK=E%ULEN=134%DAT=E)
Figure 5. 1st Generation Nmap Fingerprint.
Since the operating system fingerprints for the Smart-Phone environments were not compatible, Honeyd was not able to
properly run, based on syntax errors produced by the 2nd generation Nmap fingerprints added to the “nmap.prints” file.
When those additional fingerprints were removed from the “nmap.prints”file, Honeyd was unable to find the fingerprints
requested in the configuration file and subsequently did not initiate.
Even if Honeyd was able to emulate the Smart-Phone fingerprints successfully based on Nmap scans, additional testing
of the Honeyd configuration by known vulnerabilities would be limited by the fact there are currently no known
Windows Mobile automated malware in the wild. This type of malware has been created by Becher, Freiling & Leider
(2007) in controlled environments, thus there is an assumption that some form of specific malware will created in the
near future, as Windows Mobile smart phones become more prolific and more of a target to malicious third parties.
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CONCLUSION
A 1st generation honey-pot designed to specifically discover knowledge of the existence of automated worms targeting
smart-phones is a possible concept. The methodology of discovering available ports on actual Windows Mobile 5 and
Windows Mobile 6 smart-phone devices using Nmap network scanner and then emulating those ports in a Honeyd
honey-pot seems viable. Yet the method of using Honeyd to emulate smart-phone operating systems including Windows
Mobile 5 and Windows Mobile 6 cannot be tested for viability until a technique is created to adopt the format of 2nd
generation Nmap operating system fingerprints to the format utilised by Honeyd. When this technique is proven, Nmap
testing of the Honeyd honey-pot will be possible to further understand the abilities and attack vectors of smart-phone
worms.
The next step will be researching and creating a technique that will allow a conversion of a 2nd generation Nmap
fingerprint into the format utilised by Honeyd. This will be critical to achieving the aims of testing the concept and
discovering automated smart-phone malware of the 1st Generation Smart-phone honey-pot. Consequently this technique
should allow the addition of more Operating System fingerprints of other Smart-phone environments including devices
running the Google Andriod and Apple iPhone Operating Systems to be added to further generations of smart-phone
honeypots.
Secondly, once the issue highlighted by this paper is rectified, Virtual Machines running the Windows Mobile5 and
Windows Mobile 6 emulators could be linked to the Honeyd Honeypot, allowing any detected malware to be observed
performing its functions in a high-interaction environment. Such information could be used to reverse engineer new
mobile malware and provide insight into the methods that malware writers will use attack Smart-phone devices and
operating systems.
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